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In a recent article, William M. LeoGrande portrayed the Salvadoran 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) as a moderate political 
force, struggling to achieve "military reforms that Washington itself has long 
sought."1 On the other hand, Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley contends that "by 
both act and ideology . . . the Salvadoran guerrillas have set themselves apart 
from almost all other regional revolutionaries," and that "the closest parallel to 
their acts seems to be Sendero Luminoso... "2 The FMLN has many faces, and 
apparently, an analyst for each of them. After a decade of war, numerous 
communiqués, interviews and peace proposals, one can still ask: What is the 
FMLN and what does it want ? 
The primary concern of this article is to interpret me nature and political 
orientation of the FMLN through five key organizational and positional as-
pects.3 First, it examines the FMLN's configuration as a "front"; that is, a 
unification of various organizations sharing the conviction of being the van-
guard of the Salvadoran people. Then, the article tries to understand its political 
orientation by explaining its position on four interconnected issues: National 
Liberation, Peace, Elections, and War. It attempts to demonstrate that the 
FMLN is an aggregate of politico-military groups which, pending the conquest 
of power and the implementation of radical socio-economic and political 
changes in El Salvador, strives to deligitimize the current regime, and to be 
recognized by the other political actors as a legitimate member of their club. The 
essay concludes with two conditions which must be fulfilled by the FMLN in 
order for it to have meaningful negotiations with the government and ultimately 
reach a durable peace in El Salvador. 
FRONT 
Among the major contemporary guerrilla movements in Latin America, 
the Salvadoran's has proven to be the most composite, aggregating tens of 
officially distinct organizations. Therefore, before discussing the FMLN's 
political agenda, it is necessary to draw a portrait of its somewhat elusive 
organization. A front usually means a coalition of various organizations, united 
for a specific goal and in which each retains its own identity. The FMLN was 
formed on 10 October 1980.4 Its main components are the Popular Liberation 
Forces (FPL, founded in 1970), the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP-1972), 
the National Resistance (RN-1975), the Central American Revolutionary 
Workers' Party (PRTC-1976), and the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS-
1932). These groups are considered either as pure military organizations, or as 
broad "political-military" organizations, encompassing specific military wings 
such as the Popular Armed Forces of Liberation (FAPL/FPL), the Armed Forces 
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of National Resistance (FARN/RN), the Popular Armed Forces of Liberation 
(FARPL/PRTC) and the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL/PCS). 
All these military wings, sometimes called the Popular Army ofLiberation 
(EPL), were first coordinated by the Unified Revolutionary Direction (DRU-
1980). However, sincetheDRU was sometimes called the Unified Revolutionary 
"Political-Military" Direction (DRU-PM), it is difficult to know what groups 
—the military or the political-military—this Direction coordinated. Moreover, 
it remains unclear whether the DRU (PM) has been supplanted by the FMLN. 
Today, the highest executive body seems to be the General Command of the 
FMLN, although the function and importance of the FMLN's Joint Chief of 
Staff (Estado Mayor General Conjunto ) remains unclear. No definitive evi-
dence leads us to affirm that all these acronyms and appellations reflect 
permanent hierarchical or political distinctions. 
Originally, these organizations were linked to "popular organizations" 
formed during the late 1970s.3 In January 1980, the Revolutionary Coordination 
of the Masses (CRM) was created to unify them. Basically, the "popular 
organizations" were "federations" mobilizing from above some fifteen unions 
and student's organizations.6 None of these organizations are still active today, 
as a result of both the heavy repression in the early 1980s and the FMLN's 
narrowly militaristic orientation.7 After its unsuccessful "final offensive" in 
January 1981, the FMLN moved into the countryside and neglected the 
"masses" for most of the remaining decade. For urban support, the FMLN now 
relies more informally on such organizations as the National Union of Salvadoran 
Workers (UNTS) or the Committee of Mothers and Relatives of Political 
Prisoners, Disappeared, and Assassinated (COMADRES) as well as on other 
more or less independent groups and institutions (the "popular church," the 
National University, the various solidarity networks, etc.).8 The popular 
movement network in Fi Salvador is indeed in an endless process of renewal.9 
Finally, the FMLN is linked strategically to the Democratic Revolution-
ary Front (FDR-1980). In fact, both are often presented as a single front: the 
FDR-FMLN (or the FMLN-FDR.) The FDR was primarily a front of fronts, 
bringing together the CRM and the so-called Democratic Front (FD).10 This was 
before the virtual disappearance of the CRM and its components — hence the 
near symmetry between the FDR and the recently created Democratic Con-
vergence (CD). Today, the FDR is basically a coalition of two "political 
parties:" Guillermo Ungo's MNR and Ruben Zamora's MPSC; the Social 
Democratic Party being relatively new and weak.11 The FDR is still linked to 
the FMLN through a Politico-Diplomatic Commission (CPD-1981), but offi-
cially remains an "autonomous" organization.12 
This portrait is doubtless sketchy. A complete picture should also 
include the "brigades" and the urban "commandos" whose undeniable (and 
possibly growing) autonomy in the FMLN remains to be systematically eluci-
dated.13 Given all these uncertainties, the self-confidence with which most 
observers present the Salvadoran "revolutionary movemenf (with significant 
variations from one author to another) is somewhat amazing.14 
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For the FMLN the notion of front also strongly suggests a notion of 
leadership. In the early 1980s, according to its Leninist mind-set, the FMLN 
openly proclaimed itself as the "vanguard" of the Salvadoran people13 before 
starting to deny—rather confusedly—having any hegemonic ambition.16 Who 
exactly belongs to this vanguard is not an easy question to answer. It seems, for 
example, that almost every rebel who can give an interview, and they are several, 
is a contondante. During the last military offensive, me FMLN general com-
mand's communiqués (unlike 1989's peace proposals) were all signed by the 
same five commandants: Eduardo Sancho (nom de guerre: Fermân Cienfuegos), 
Francisco Jovel (Roberto Roca), Jorge Shafik Handal, Salvador Sanchez Ceréen 
(Leonel Gonzalez) and Joaqufn Villalobos (René Cruz). Whether they are 
"more equal" than other comandantes — like Claudio Armijo, Leo Cabrai, 
Nidia Diaz, Facundo Guardado, Ana Maria Guadalupe Martinez, among many 
others — is still an open question. 
This vanguardismo raises the very important question of the FDR's role 
in the "revolutionary movement." Its official position is somewhat ambiguous. 
On the one hand, the 1987 political pact with the FMLN stated that both fronts 
are distinct and autonomous. Officially, "the FDR is not the FMLN's political 
wing, nor is the latter the FDR's military wing."17 As a matter of fact, the FDR's 
participation in the "counter-insurgency plan" (the last presidential elections) 
under the CD'sbanner,along with the FDR'sdisagreementwith the commanders' 
decision to break off talks with the government in Fall 1989, are the last 
indicators of its growing autonomy.18 
On the other hand, according to the 1987 pact, both organizations 
coincide in struggling for the "defeat of the counterinsurgency project" and for 
the "triumph of the democratic revolution, anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialistic." 
They are supposed to take decisions by "consensus" and to consult one another 
for the elaboration of a "common tactic and action plan." True, they do not 
officially share the same "final program" and "ideology," but they still fight to 
"reach together the political power in El Salvador."19 The CD's programatic 
platform repeats almost textuaUy the FMLN argument against elections, making 
its decision to participate in the March 1989 contest somewhat contradictory.20 
All in all, the FDR agenda and strategy remain unclear, as does for that matter, 
the CD's. The FDR might be part of the "revolutionary vanguard" and pursue 
the FMLN's agenda by other means. But as a politico-military organization, the 
FMLN is clearly what Régis Debray called the "vanguard of me vanguard."21 
Therefore, to agree on substance with the FMLN while diverging on style and 
tactics is a doubtful and risky business.22 
In summary, the creation and consolidation of the FMLN in the 1980s 
has meant a qualitative step toward the unity of the revolutionary forces in El 
Salvador, though probably not a definitive one. The elusiveness of its organi-
zational structure, in spite of tremendous ideological homogeneity,23 suggests 
that the issue of power is not yet settled amongst the different groups, levels, 
zones, and leaders. In fact, the definitive unification seems to be contingent 
upon the fate of the "revolution" itself and not just of the FMLN's organization 
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stricto sensu. Ultimately, the FMLN must be the unique front of all the 
Salvadoran people; the FMLN must be the people. Hence the link between the 
front and its goal: the national liberation of the Salvadoran people. 
NATIONAL LIBERATION 
The FMLN's original mind-set is clearly rooted in die ideas of the Latin 
American Castroite generation. In fact, all the guerrilla movements of the 1960s 
and 1970s, at least in Central America, have been deeply influenced by the 
ideology developed by Castro and its followers after the downfall of Batista.24 
Even the so-called "fifty years" of "Sandinista" insurrection is largely a myth, 
since the FSLN was formed almost thirty years after the assassination of 
Sandino, and was all but a group of Leninist university cliques before the 1970s. 
These guerrillas have little in common with previous Latin American revolu-
tionary movements (Bolivia, Guatemala and Mexico), let alone the fundamen-
tally "defensive" Spanish guerrillas of the early ninetheenth century.25 
For these contemporary guerrilla movements, national liberation appears 
as an anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic and anti-capitalist struggle, and, further-
more, as a will to build a new egalitarian society under the guidance of a virtuous 
politico-military vanguard. The "revolutionary process" is one of deep political 
and socio-economic transformations but it is also one in which the current 
contradictions of modernity — between the city and countryside, intellectual 
and manual work, men and women, rulers and the ruled, etc. — are addressed 
and hopefully resolved. The outcome is a new society and a "new man," who 
works with enthusiasm, participates actively in the implementation of revolu-
tionary policies, and abides by the highest moral standards.26 
This communalistic vision of the world is very common amongst the 
contemporary guerrilla movements in Latin America and has been "hegemonic" 
for almost three decades in die cradle of all guerrilla movements in Latin 
America: the national (and some catholic) universities.27 It is currently epito-
mized by the Peruvian Shining Path, which brings out very clearly the nearly 
religious inspiration that distinguishes the contemporary Latin American guer-
rillas from the more Promethean European socialist movement. It might be 
interesting in this regard to consider the Shinning Path as an "ideal-type" to 
analyze die other guerrilla movements in Latin America. Lead by a professor 
and composed mainly of university students, the Sendero Luminoso is very 
dogmatic and believes in die pedagogical aspect of military actions. Highly 
paternalistic toward die lower classes, it mistrusts whoever is not under its 
control. At the same time, it resents and fears the cities, die birthplace of vice 
and alienation. Since the cities are also the cradle of guerrillas, die rebels absolve 
themselves by taking refuge in the mountains, a sort of purgatory of suffering 
and loneliness. However, tiieir sins could not be totally absolved short of an 
apocalyptic change in every aspectof social life (Revolution... ),orshortoftheir 
own personal sacrifice (... o muerte ). In Central American leftist movements, 
it is very likely mat dus ideological eclectism, botii "progressist" and "pre-
modern", has been strengthened by die strong influence of radical priests during 
die last twenty years.28 
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National liberation is also a practical goal, not just a theoretical one. In 
this regard, the FMLN has already sent signals that it is becoming more flexible. 
The former rector of the Jesuit University who was assassinated in November 
1989, Ignacio FJlacurfa, even said in early 1989 that the FMLN was experienc-
ing its "Vatican JJ"!29 Calls for "socialism" or the recognition of the two armies 
have given place in most of its recent communiqué to dry military reports and 
calls for peace, negotiation and democracy. So much so that Joaquin Villalobos, 
the FMLN's most talkative comandante, is almost right to proclaim that the 
Army Proclamation of October 1979 sounds more radical than the FMLN's 
public platform.30 
Here we must understand that the FMLN's call for peace and democracy 
does not contradict its commitment to armed struggle or its Leninist inspiration. 
The FMLN has belatedly learned that national liberation is not just a goal but a 
process, with consecutive stages.31 From the mid-1980s on, the FMLN pro-
posed to join with any other forces in a Government of Broad Participation 
(GAP) on certain conditions, which were unacceptable to the government. In 
its proposal of 31 January 1984, explicitly aimed at the formation of a GAP, the 
FMLN claimed as "immediate measures" the abolition of the 1983 Constitution, 
the recognition of the "Popular power" (e.g. the territory under FMLN's military 
control), the dissolution of the security forces and the purge of the military, 
among others demands. Once these immediate measures were fulfilled, the 
FMLN identified some guidelines for a transition toward a Revolutionary 
Democratic Government (GDR) and negotiation of a military truce. Although, 
the FMLN discarded the idea of immediate hegemony, it clearly formulated its 
own conditions for the formation of the GAP and set the agenda for the transition 
to the GDR. 
In some recent peace proposals discussed below, the conditions claimed 
by the FMLN for a rapprochement with the other political forces seem less 
constraining. However, the GDR is still the ultimate goal.32 Yet it is hard to 
know exactly what the FMLN means by that. The "GDR's seven points" 
announcedby the "DRU of the FMLN" in December 1980 are almost meaningless 
as a political platform. They are general guidelines, not policy proposals. The 
FMLN obviously realized that the lenghty Marxist CRM platform of February 
1980,aUegedlysurnrriarized by the "seven points", wasapoliticalembarassment33 
Typically, the only relatively clear points are those dealing with who will be 
admitted to participate: those who "contributed actively in the overthrow of the 
fascist dictatorship" and the "patriotic" sectors of the armed forces.34 
In short, one can say that the GDR is "strategically" transitional.33 It is 
a direction, a path toward socialism.36 Notwithstanding his willingness to 
highlight the "important historical and strategic relationship with social democ-
racy by means of the FDR-FMLN alliance," Villalobos makes very clear that the 
FMLN, and for that matter the Salvadoran revolution, should not be confused 
with the social democratic movement and its agenda: "We do not intend to 
present the Salvadoran revolution as a social democratic revolution; that, in 
addition to being false, would be schematic."37 Not surprisingly, the platform 
presented by the CD (also labeled "GDR") during the last elections was seen by 
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Villalobos as a mere "way to move forward to a negotiated solution"—that is, 
a preliminary step.3* This does not contradict with the FMLN's public approval 
of the CD program: it could even approve a far more moderate program, or even 
the idea of having no program at all. Again, the FMLN is not a political party 
searching to mandate a specific platform, but the vanguard of a "revolution," 
which is both an end and a process, or as suggested previously, a direction. 
The GDR is now toned down, like most contentious issues likely to 
thwart FMLN endeavors to gain recognition by the political club. In fact, the 
GDR is being replaced by the word "peace"; both mean a consensual society in 
which the FMLN no longer has reason to wage war.39 In spite of this new 
approach, however, there is no evidence that the FMLN has given up its Leninist 
conception of the state and the revolution. When talking about the FMLN's 
"Vatican IF', Ignacio Ellacuria rightly added that "as in the Council case, [this 
new approach] does not mean a rupture with the essence of its inspiration and 
its intentions."40 
A few months before the November 1989 offensive, Villalobos said 
straightforwardly: "It would be dishonest and ridiculous to deny the influence 
of Marxism and Leninism within the FMLN . . . . The FMLN understands 
Marxism-Leninism as a scientific discipline for analyzing reality and as an 
organizational theory for struggle. But we do not convert the tenets of Marxism-
Leninism into dogma that might isolate us from reality.'*41 In the early 1990s, 
this "but" is not as reassuring as it would have been (at least) a decade earlier. 
Besides, one must emphasize that Villalobos is quoted from his article published 
in Foreign Policy, that is, under extraordinary incentive to sound "moderate." 
The FMLN remains consistent in its appraisal of the current political 
situation in El Salvador, in its condemnation of capitalism and imperialism, and 
in its reluctance to consider die Salvadoran government and army as little more 
than Yankee puppets. In the first part of his article quoted above (Foreign Policy 
published only the second part), Villalobos contends that "the capitalist mod-
ernization and the pseudo reformism [in El Salvador] failed, and there is actually 
no feasible way out for the system."42 He also qualifies the Castroite regime as 
a "people's democracy."43 In its year-end message in January 1990, the FMLN 
interpreted the recent events in East Europe and Soviet Union very much like the 
very conservative French Communist Party: "This renewal process has been 
victoriously interpreted by the United States as the internment of communism. 
In fact, communism has never existed until today." As for the assessment of 
"real" socialism, the FMLN is startlingly positive: "The socialist system has 
clearly proved that it is a more human system and that it is capable of facing the 
greatest challenges that mankind will encounter in the next millennium."44 
Equally important is the way the FMLN perceives its actions and the 
other political players. Acts of sabotage and killing of opponents, even 
civilians, are still viewed as necessary in the process of raising the masses' 
consciousness.43 Referring to these attacks — and particularly to the "Zona 
Rosa" operation, during which American advisors and unarmed individuals 
were machine-gunned at a San Salvador terrace46—Villalobos stated mat they 
"not only hit the principal enemy, but they did it in the fundamental zone, 
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where the classes and the social contradictions are expressed more acutely and 
shamefully for the popular movement." In his view, "those acts moralize the 
people and demoralize the enemy."47 
The "war" justifies not only assaults against military barracks, but also 
against presumed "informants" and civilian officers. Even innocent civilians 
are easily sacrified for the sake of the Revolution. The argument can be made 
that if thé rebels launched the offensive in the most crowded neighborhood of 
San Salvador in November 1989, it was not in spite of but because they expected 
a violent and indiscriminate response from the military.48 Furthermore, the use 
(and misuse) of heavy artillery by the rebels against military targets located in 
densely populated areas have caused numerous casualties amongst innocent 
civilians, ft has been repeatedly criticized across the board, even by FMLN 
sympathizers concerned with the political cost of such operations. However, it 
has not led to any significant change in the FMLN's behavior.49 All these in-
dicators raise doubts about the intellectual evolution of the FMLN's leadership 
and rank-and-file, whose radicalism is certainly unparalleled in Latin America, 
including Cuba and Nicaragua during their insurrectional periods.30 
In summary, it is difficult to see how national liberation can be matched 
with any pluralistic conception of political action and social change. What will 
happen if the FMLN does not feel represented enough in an eventual govern-
ment of broad participation, keeping in mind that it does not intend to lay down 
arms at this stage or ever ?M How can the FMLN end its struggle for national 
liberation without eliminating most of the current political players ? These 
questions are now postponed by the FMLN. It no longer wants the central 
question of power sharing to rest explicitly on the short-term agenda, as in the 
past Villalobos enunciated this in a puzzling formula: "Ultimately it is not a 
question of sharing or not sharing power, but of forging a true democracy in El 
Salvador."52 All the FMLN wants for the moment is to move forward. So the 
comandantes talk about peace and sometimes elections, but firmly hold onto 
their weapons. 
PEACE 
If the elections are a major part of the counterinsurgency plan, the peace 
proposals are equally a part of the insurgents' strategy. The vast majority of the 
Salvadoran people want peace; that is, a final and rapid end to the hostilities. 
Attentive to the people's will, all political actors in El Salvador strive for peace. 
In fact, every single actor in the lingering Central American civil war — 
belligerent, observer, arms dealer, foreign government, fellow traveller and of 
course "Latin Americanist" — is warmly favorable to a peaceful settlement. 
There is probably no other conflict in recent history that has brought so many 
peace lovers into existence. However, peace could also be seen as a long range 
goal, for which it is first imperative to eliminate the "enemies of peace;" which 
means waging war. In this perspective, nothing could be more peace-oriented 
than a military offensive, the machine-gun being the necessary complement to 
the white dove.53 
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Over the last ten years, the FMLN has presented many peace proposals. 
The first one was typically presented in an international forum. That was in 
September 1981, when Daniel Ortega read the FMLN's "proposal for direct 
negotiations" to the United Nations' General Assembly. From then on, FMLN's 
representatives have met numerous times with civil and military officials, in and 
out of El Salvador. But none of these initiatives have come close to achieving 
a significant and lasting agreement. 
On 23 January 1989, less than two months before the presidential 
elections, the FMLN formulated a comprehensive peace proposal, certainly its 
most successful ever. The up-coming elections in March 1989, the fifth since 
the war began, promised to be another set-back for the insurgents, above all 
with the embarassing participation of the FDR through its new electoral 
vehicle, the CD. There are also indications that this bold move was a response 
to a perceived decrease in popular support, including among its own troops.54 
Essentially, the FMLN's proposal agreed to recognize the electoral result, 
provided the elections constitutionally due in March were postponed until 
September IS; that is, more than three months after the end of Duarte's 
constitutional mandate. The proposal included other specific and sound 
requests, such as the integration of the CD into the Elections Central Council, 
the reform of the electoral code and the possibility of Salvadorans living 
abroad to cast their vote. The FMLN also announced that it would support the 
CD candidates and platform. But the fundamental point is the recognition of 
the electoral results, without any claim to power sharing or the fusion of the 
two armies (at this stage). 
This proposal is a landmark for two basic reasons. First, unlike the 
previous proposals, acceptance of power sharing and recognition of the two 
armies do not appear as preconditions to an agreement. Second, for the first 
time the FMLN agreed to recognize the legitimacy of an electoral process 
under the current regime. Even if the proposal has been greeted with sentiments 
ranging from caution to suspicion by the other political forces, one can say 
that in light of the legacy of war and mistrust, the response, as a first step, was 
rather positive and encouraging.35 
The proposal also reveals the limits of the FMLN's "new thinking". 
First, the FMLN proposed a military truce starting just four days before the 
elections and lasting until four days after the elections. Later, it was extended 
to sixty days: thirty days before the elections and thirty days after. Following 
this pause, military pressure would resume, which indicates clearly that by 
recognizing "the legitimacy of the electoral result", the FMLN did not intend to 
recognize the legitimacy of the new government, let alone die regime. There is 
no evidence whatsoever that the FMLN was about to lay down its arms after the 
elections. In the proposal, it is said that if all its conditions were respected, it 
would make "possible an irreversible political solution to the conflict" In other 
words, it would make possible a process of reconciliation, which, as we will see 
below, involves other dramatic steps. 
This confusion suggests that the reason the FMLN did not formulate 
that proposal four months earlier (which would have deprived the Duarte 
58 
Conflict Quarterly 
government and the army of their constitutional excuse to reject it) was 
precisely to show its lack of concern for the current political rules in El 
Salvador.56 If accepted by the government—a possibility perhaps unforeseen 
and unwanted by the commanders — this "let's-forget-the-constitution" pro-
posal would have in fact replaced the "counter-insurgent" endeavor toward 
legalistic rule and institution building (successful or not), with the traditional 
FMLN approach which favors an equal status for all "belligerents".57 
Second, this was not a final proposal to end the war, but rather one to 
"convert the elections into a contribution toward peace."58 After many debates 
and discussions, the political parties met with the FMLN representatives on 20 
and 21 February in Oaxtepec, Mexico. The rebels presented a new set of 
conditions "so mat the implementation and realization of our proposal on 
elections might lead to a definitive end to the war."59 Thus, they asked 1) for 
the prosecution and indictment of all individuals involved in the massacres 
and political crimes during the decade; 2) for the reduction of the army from 
about 55,000 troops to its size in 1978 (12,000 troops); and finally 3) for the 
complete restructuring of the Security Forces (National Police, National Guard 
and Treasury Police) into a new single force headed by the civilian-led 
Ministry of the Interior. 
Were they accepted, these conditions would have marked a very posi-
tive step toward political democratization in El Salvador. But it was unac-
ceptable to the army, and therefore unacceptable to the government. The 
FMLN must have known that it would be next to unthinkable for the army to 
accept a thorough purge in its ranks for the crimes committed over the last ten 
years; especially if the purge was more or less directly monitored by those 
unpunished "terrorists", who spent this period storming military barracks, 
among other military and non-military targets. During the transition in Ar-
gentina, the Montoneros were in jail, not among the prosecutors. 
The reduction of troops by almost eighty percent and the dissolution of 
the current security forces were hardly imaginable without a foreign military 
intervention. The argument can be made that the contondantes, knowing then-
enemies very well, foresaw that these conditions could not be accepted by the 
Salvadoran army.60 It is therefore tempting to consider that this peace proposal 
was a continuation of war by other means. 
On 6 April 1989, the FMLN came back with a new proposition, on the 
grounds that the presidential elections and their results "do not represent the 
desire and will of the majority of the Salvadoran people," and consequently 
that the ARENA government was "illegitimate."6, The FMLN asked for new 
elections and new negotiations on three conditions: 1) an "agreement on 
democratization"; 2) an "agreement to set basis on which the structural causes 
of war could be resolved"; and 3) an "agreement to attain peace." Basically, 
this proposal included no new demands except some vague claims for "real 
democracy", for addressing the "structural causes of the war" and for a "new 
society." Among the structural causes traditionally underlined by the FMLN, 
the agrarian structure is clearly the most important. A few months before the 
April proposal, Villalobos said: "So long as El Salvador's agrarian structure is 
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not profoundly transformed, the war will go on for many years, not because 
some leaders order conflict, but for a simple social reason: too many Salvadorans 
live in a very small area."62 Very interestingly, were all these conditions 
accepted, the negotiations on "cease-fire" might finally "start" to determine 
not an end to hostilities but the "territorial delimitation and the mechanism to 
make it respected by all sides." So the government and the army were asked 
to go through all those steps toward reconciliation only to be finally confronted 
with the option of negotiating the size of the national territory conceded to the 
FMLN. 
The April proposal is clearer than the January proposal for two reasons. 
First, it clarified that the rebels were ready to talk about a truce, not about a 
surrender. They would give up neither armed struggle nor the so-called liberated 
zones.63 Second, the radical socio-economic reforms for which they started 
fighting in the first place were at least mentioned. There is no evidence that the 
FMLN might lay down arms before the "structural causes" of the war were 
addressed. In September 1989, the FMLN presented a new proposal that did 
mention the conditions for a definitive ending of hostilities (among which, a 
constitutional reform to advance the 1991 legislative and municipal elections), 
but these were vague and unrealistic, and lacked the political impact of the 
January proposal.64 Moreover, one suspects that the comandantes were already 
planning the military offensive launched less than two months later.63 
The most recent round of negotiations within the framework set by the 
Geneva agreement in April 1990, have stalled amid growing intransigence from 
both sides.66 The FMLN, for one, has bolstered its demands, particularly 
concerning what it calls the "demilitarization" of the Salvadoran society. Since 
August 1990, the FMLN asks nothing less man the "total abolition of the 
army."67 Moreover, in its "Program" of September 1990, the FMLN asks 
explicitely for the creation of a "new socio-economic order" and a "new 
constitution," among other demands. All in all, the gap between the FMLN and 
government has not been this wide since the mid-1980s. 
All these remarks do not mean that the FMLN's proposals are valueless. 
The FMLN is pointing out some real obstacles to democratization in El 
Salvador, e.g. the size and composition of the current army and security forces. 
Moreover, it provides some leeway for other players to push their own agenda 
in the short run. One should remember that uncertainty is a fundamental 
ingredient for democratization. As the recent developments in Nicaragua 
suggest, the opening of the political space may bring about unpredictable 
outcomes. However, the cost of meeting the rebels' concessions, even on an 
"installment plan," appears as high as ever; even higher, since Fall 1989. 
Without casting doubt about their will as individuals to end hostilities (after all, 
they are also victims of this war), it is hard to avoid the conclusion mat their 
political objective is not primarily to attain peace, but to alter the basis on which 
negotiations have taken place so far. That is, from the current one, which 
bestows legitimacy to the Cristiani government (based on the current constitu-
tion and electoral system), to one that denies it this advantage. The FMLN does 
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not just want peace; literally, to quote Villalobos, it wants to "put peace above 
existing laws.*** All its peace proposals have this common denominator: they 
ask the government to admit publicly its illegitimacy. They vary only in what 
the next step should be. 
ELECTIONS 
In the FMLN's January 1989 proposal the legitimacy of elections is 
typically separated from that of the government and the regime, something 
hardly thinkable in a liberal bourgeois perspective. For self-proclaimed 
Leninists, elections could be a useful device in specific conditions, but cer-
tainly not the cornerstone of democracy. Since the "revolution" aims at 
achieving social justice, it is largely a zero-sum game. This is not easily 
compatible with a bourgeois bill of rights, as demonstrated among others by 
Hannah Arendt in her classic essay on the French and the American revolu-
tions. Furthermore, the poor score achieved by the CD in the last elections 
confirms the contondantes' premonition mat revolution and elections are not 
easy things to conjugate.69 
In early 1989 Villalobos condemned the coming elections as a "funda-
mental political component of the low intensity war plan" — which is the 
truth, though not all the truth. He goes on: "The US embassy hopes that the 
FMLN will concede to a truce during the elections and by doing so, along with 
the CD participation, will renew the interest of the masses for elections. But 
the elections can neither dismantle the social outbreak nor turn the correlation 
of forces to the counterinsurgency's advantage. The elections are a much 
insufficient tool to fix such a deep economic and political crisis and for 
overcoming the dimension of this war."70 On the other hand, the FMLN does 
not reject elections as such; but then, who does? For Villalobos: "The FMLN 
is not against elections in principle. It is against elections realized during a 
war, when the country is subdued to the United States, which is the country 
that actually determines die fate of FJ Salvador. If the national sovereignty is 
not restored and a national solution to the war is not found, there will be no 
true elections in FJ Salvador."71 
These two last statements summarize the FMLN's position on elections. 
First, the elections are not very important at this point Second, numerous 
changes must be brought about before free and fair elections can take place, 
much beyond the security of its members (e.g. the "national sovereignty" must 
be "restored" and a "national solution to the war" must be found.) In other 
words, the FMLN does not rule out the ballot box as a possible option during the 
"revolutionary process" as long as it does not bog down or interrupt the rebels' 
course toward national liberation. And, although the FMLN decided early this 
year, for the very first time, not to disrupt the electoral process, there is no 
evidence that it abided by the results to the point of bestowing more legitimacy 
on the government or the regime. 
In summary, it seems that for the FMLN, as for many other political 
actors in Latin America, elections are legitimate inasmuch as they do not allow 
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the enemy—typically "anti-democratic"—to capture the central power. It also 
echoes an old revolutionary principle, which states there should be "no freedom 
for the enemies of freedom" (Saint-Just). Typically, in its statements on 
elections since 1982, the FMLN indifferently claimed that it did not 
participate because the elections were unfair, and that the elections were unfair 
or not really significant because it did not participate.73 The link between 
elections and legitimacy is loose at best; almost non-existent between elections 
and power. What matters is who wants (and is authorized) to play in the political 
competition, and under what conditions. 
WAR 
To understand the political orientation of the FMLN one should not be 
confounded either by its peace proposals, or by its timely statements on 
democracy and elections. One must pay more attention to the adamant 
resolution with which the FMLN claims to preserve and even expand its 
military capability. War (or armed struggle) is, along with national liberation, 
the key concept in understanding the FMLN. 
The rebels have proposed military truces but have never contemplated 
renouncing armed struggle short of a significant victory on bom the military 
and political fronts. For the FMLN arms are tantamount to power: the 
people's power. This power is absolutely non-negotiable, because the fate of 
peace and democratization in El Salvador lie on one fundamental and almost 
exclusive factor, the "correlation of forces." The rebels can go back and forth 
on elections, power sharing or military truces, from one proposal to the next. 
These issues are not fundamental to the FMLN. However, since they are 
fundamental to its enemies, the rebels have learned to use them periodically — 
above all before elections. These issues are "money," following the Parsonian 
metaphor, in the negotiation with the Salvadoran government and the Yankees. 
However, to give up one machine gun would be a sacrilege. The arms should 
be like the people: one and indivisible. Sometime in the future dûs power, still 
virtual and almost mythical, will be reconciled with reality. 
To begin, commandante Roberto Roca (of the PRTC tendency) put it 
bluntly: "We always have had a policy of negotiated settlement to this conflict 
and we have launched successive calls for dialogue and negotiation... but we 
always said and we reiterate it before the government that we will never lay 
down our arms, ever. The arms represent a huge conquest for the democratic 
and revolutionary forces, linked to the clearest interests of the broad masses. 
Neither Duarte nor Reagan can ask the FMLN, the people's revolutionary 
vanguard, to concede on the [bargaining] table what they couldn't achieve on 
the battle field."74 As a reply to the question "What are the minimal conditions 
to lay down the arms ?" commandante Villalobos replied very clearly: "Lay 
down the arms? We don't have any conditions because we are not about to lay 
down arms, ever."75 
Armed struggle is the very raison d'être of the FMLN as vanguard of 
the revolution and the Salvadoran people. The correlation of forces which 
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determines the FMLN's destiny will ultimately determine the destiny of the 
revolution. "El Salvador needs a revolutionary change to establish a democratic 
and pluralistic society; that change needs to be guaranteed by military power," 
said Villalobos.76 Logically, revolutionary changes are more likely to be carried 
out if the correlation of forces favor the FMLN. If there is just an equilibrium 
the FMLN can try to improve its position, through negotiation and/or bullets.77 
If there is a perceived imbalance at the expense of the FMLN, then the rebels 
must put the revolutionary agenda and the negotiations aside and improve their 
power position by force. Whatever the scenario, the FMLN's power lies in its 
military might. 
A recent illustration of this approach is indeed the major military 
offensive called "Out With The Fascists; Febe Elizabeth is Alive" launched on 
11 November 1989.78 It seems that for many combatants on the spot, and maybe 
some senior commanders in Managua, November 1989 was a'final offensive", 
as in January 1981.79 A few days after the offensive began, the FMLN ordered 
its troops and the population under its control to form "popular governments" 
and "to get stronger until the total control of the country [is achieved]."80 One 
of the most prominent leaders of the Politico-Diplomatic Commission of the 
FDR/FMLN, Salvador Samayoa, said emphatically: "There is no longer a 
possibility to back away. Now, the only possible negotiation is on the basis of 
the overthrow of the Cristiani government"81 Unlike in January 1981,however, 
most commandants foresaw that the whole operation might end up as a 
successful military operation, but not a total victory. So they refrained from 
proclaiming a "final offensive" unless it turned out to be feasible.82 
The FMLN's official justification for this operation is quite similar to 
that adopted after the failure of the "final offensives" early in 1981. The 
objective was to prove the FMLN's military capacity to escalate the war, with 
the ultimate goal being to improve correspondingly its political leverage with 
the government, the army and its sponsor, the United States.83 The FMLN 
specifically targeted what they perceived to be the two pillars of the 
counterinsurgent strategy.84 First, it successfully challenged the assumption 
that the FMLN was a desperate and crippled army. For the first time, the 
FMLN extended its attack across the rich neighboihoods of San Salvador with 
remarkable mobility and — most important for the rebels — before the eyes 
of a very important visitor, the General Secretary of the OAS, Dr. Baena 
Soares.85 Second, it challenged the idea, increasingly accepted even among 
the democratic left, that the "moderate" faction of ARENA was now in 
command of both the governement and the army. Here, the similarity with the 
rebels' reaction to the formation of a reformist government in October 1979 is 
striking: in both cases they forced the supposedly moderate government to 
"show its true face" by launching military attacks in the highly populated areas 
(Ayutuxtepeque, Ciudad Delgado, Ilopango, Mejicanos, Soyapango, Zacamil). 
To put it bluntly, they provoked the army.86 
In the final analysis, everything happened as if the FMLN's mentor 
was not Lenin or Castro, but the US scholar Charles Anderson. More than 
twenty years ago, Anderson contended: "One may say that the most persistent 
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political phenomenon in Latin America is the effort of contenders for power 
to demonstrate a power capability sufficient to be recognized by other power 
contenders, and that the political process consists of manipulation and nego-
tiation among power contenders reciprocally recognizing each other's power 
capability."87 However, the FMLN apparently failed to understand that as 
emphasized by Anderson, this kind of strategy only works under specific 
conditions. For him, "new power contenders will be admitted to the system 
only when they do not jeopardize the position of established contenders.. ."88 
The last peace proposals were apparently too few too late to reassure the 
contenders, and to convince them that the FMLN was a legitimate political 
force. Hence, as in the Hannah Arendt's model, violence appears as a 
substitute for power, not as a demonstration thereof.89 
It is doubtful, though not impossible, that the military pressure will 
allow the FMLN to attain its objective.90 But according to Ruben Zamora, the 
FMLN "has created a tragic paradox" in launching its 1989 general offensive: 
"While it demonstrated that there is no military solution to the costly civil war, 
it has hardened the armed forces' opposition to serious negotiations and to the 
democratic forces that support this alternative."91 In Washington, President 
Bush's first reaction was to ask Congress to increase aid for El Salvador. (In 
1981, the FMLN's final offensive caused resumption of US military aid, 
before Reagan took office.) Last Fall, the assassination of the Jesuits and the 
lack of will and capacity to prosecute its perpetrators, not the so-called 
"genocide" committed by the army during the offensive, provided the reason 
for witholding SO percent of the US military aid to El Salvador ($42.5 million). 
Finally, the offensive's impact on the Central American scene has been 
negative. In the San Isidro de Coronado's declaration of December 12, the 
five Central American presidents (including Daniel Ortega) pleaded for the 
"demobilization" of die FMLN, adding that "die presidents of Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua expressed their decisive support of 
Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani and his Government, as a faithful 
demonstration of their unvarying policy of supporting governments that are 
die product of democratic, pluralistic and participatory processes."92 
The assumption that a perceived weakness in the insurgent camp 
would induce the government to seek a military solution to die crisis is 
certainly sound and realistic. But the conclusion die rebels drew from this 
assumption, ie. mat a perceived strength would force the government to 
negotiate, is less convincing. The reason is simple: while there is still some 
evidence that die military is confident about winning the war, mere is no 
evidence of die military's fear of losing it By "escalating the war," die FMLN 
ended up escalating die army's impatience to finish it at any cost One should 
bear in mind mat die army's reaction during die last offensive was not to rush 
to die negotiating table, but to "behead" (descabezar ) the civilian leftist 
leaders, like die Jesuits of me UCA.*3 
In spite of its impressive military performance during die offensive, 
die FMLN admitted afterward diat it had failed to shake die government's and 
military's perception of its ineffective military (and merefore, for the FMLN, 
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its political) power "We view as gravely erroneous the persistence of a 
government policy based on the idea of the FMLN's alleged military weak-
ness. This position, similar to the one presented prior to November 11 will only 
lead the country to greater levels of confrontation."94 This statement suggests 
that, beyond the obvious but almost unverifiable structural causes of the 
Salvadoran internal war, one of the principal obstacles to peace is a by-product 
of this decade-long war itself; that is, the triumphalist complex. Both sides 
picture the other as an essentially weakened and isolated force, supported by 
a hostile foreign country. Throughout the 1980s and in an astonishingly 
surrealistic way during the 1981 and 1989 offensives, both camps endlessly 
claimed victory, even against blatant evidence to the contrary. In fact, one 
sometimes has the impression that they are not talking about the same war. 
All actors thus have more incentive to challenge the adversary's assumption, 
by escalating the war as well as die level of misinformation, man to bring the 
war to a conclusion. This macho triumphalism and the political blindness it 
engenders is a powerful and underestimated impediment to real negotiation 
and peaceful settlement in El Salvador. 
CONCLUSION: 
TWO CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATION AND PEACE. 
To identify all the conditions that must be fulfilled by all sectors of the 
Salvadoran political class to reach a peace settlement is beyond the scope of 
this article. As Ted Gurr (among others) has pointed out, many variables, 
societal as well as psychological, can determine the magnitude of political 
violence in a given country, and hence the obstacles to peace. However, based 
on the FMLN's conception of national liberation, peace, elections, and war, it 
is possible to suggest that two minimal conditions must be fulfilled by the 
rebels for true negotiations and peace to occur in El Salvador. First, one 
cannot come to terms with the FMLN without knowing exactly under what 
conditions the FMLN would cease the national liberation struggle and dismantle 
itself as a military organization. Second, the rebels must realize that in a 
democratization process, not everything is negotiable at the top and as a 
precondition to initiate i t A purge of the military and satisfactory human 
rights guarantees are negotiable, with sufficient US and international pressure. 
The remainder of its agenda, more or less implicitly formulated, is not. It 
means that the social and economic reforms, which are the raison d'être of 
this insurgency, must be submitted to the voters, not bartered for peace. 
Democracy is not only the result of democratization; it is also its main 
instrument In summary, in order to engage in a genuine process of negotia-
tion for democratization, the FMLN must give up the sacred Revolution. 
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